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According to some recent research, Americans hold a great deal of misinformation about
important political issues. However, such investigations treat incorrect answers to quiz
questions measuring knowledge as evidence of misinformation. This study instead defines
misperceptions as incorrect answers that respondents are confident are correct. Two sur-
veys of representative samples of American adults on the Affordable Care Act reveal that
most people were uncertain about the provisions in the law. Confidently held incorrect
beliefs were far less common than incorrect answers. Misperceptions were most prevalent
on aspects of the law on which elites prominently and persistently made incorrect claims.
Furthermore, although Americans appear to have learned about the law between 2010 and
2012, misperceptions on many provisions of the law persisted.
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Much research suggests that the information that people have about political issues
affects their policy preferences and behaviors (Bartels, 1996; Gilens, 2001; Luskin,
Fishkin, & Jowell, 2002). Until recently, however, work studying how informed people
are about issues has focused on the possession of correct beliefs and ignored posses-
sion of incorrect beliefs (Kuklinski, Quirk, Jerit, Schwieder, & Rich, 2000).
In this study, we suggest that researchers should distinguish between ignorance
(defined as lacking a correct belief on an issue) andmisperception (defined as holding
an incorrect belief with confidence). Whereas ignorance is lamentable in a demo-
cratic society,misperceptions have the potential to be dangerous.We demonstrate one
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approach to empirically distinguish between these two forms of lack of correct infor-
mation and discuss what doing so says about the American public’s understanding of
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA).
Challenges in measuring misperceptions
Studies of the prevalence, predictors, and consequences of incorrect beliefs have often
used knowledge quizzes to measure this construct (Hofstetter, Barker, Smith, Zari, &
Ingrassia, 1999; Jerit & Barabas, 2006; Kull, Ramsay, & Lewis, 2003). However, incor-
rect answers can stem from incorrect beliefs, off-target inferences, or guessing, and
traditional knowledge quizzes do not afford a way to distinguish between these alter-
natives. Thus, the proportion of incorrect answers to quiz questions is not a measure
of misinformation.1
Much past research on misinformation has focused on widely disseminated
incorrect claims (Hofstetter et al., 1999; Meirick, 2013), such as that SaddamHussein
was connected to Osama bin Laden (Prasad et al., 2009) and the assertion that
President Obama was not born in the United States (Crawford & Bhatia, 2012;
Krosnick, Malhotra, &Mittal, 2014; Pasek, Stark, Krosnick, & Tompson, 2014). In the
domain of the ACA, the contention that the law would create “death panels” (Meirick,
2013; Nyhan, 2010) has been the subject of much research. However, focusing on
widespread rumors means that researchers have rarely studied instances in which
incorrect claims were less widely disseminated through popular media. And we do
not know if inaccurate beliefs are any less common on those kinds of topics.
Tomeasuremisperceptions, we need to distinguish incorrect answers to quiz ques-
tions that are held with confidence from incorrect answers people aren’t sure about.
To do so, we conducted two surveys in which factual quiz questions were followed by
questions asking how certain the respondent was of each answer. In line with Kuk-
linski and colleagues, we treat incorrect beliefs held with certainty as misperceptions
(Kuklinski & Quirk, 2001; Kuklinski et al., 2000). Incorrect answers offered with low
certainty are treated as indicators of ignorance.
The current study
We used data from two surveys on the ACA to assess the scope and nature of the
incorrect beliefs that Americans held about the law. We combined certainty assess-
ments with incorrect answers to quiz questions to build a measure of misperceptions
for each of various attributes of the law in each of the two surveys. We used these
measures to describe the scope of misperceptions.
Methods
Data
Two surveys of nationally representative samples of American adults were con-
ducted by GfK Custom Research. A total of 1,251 individuals were interviewed
between 31 August and 7 September 2010, and another 1,334 individuals were
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interviewed between 3 August and 13 August 2012. Respondents were drawn from
the KnowledgePanel®, a group of individuals selected via probability sampling (via
random-digit dialing and address-based sampling using the USPS Computerized
Delivery Sequence File) who agreed to complete online surveys regularly. Respon-
dents who did not have a computer or Internet access were provided those at no cost.
The response rates for the 2010 and 2012 surveys (cumulative with panel recruit-
ment, CUMMRR3) were 12.0 and 9.9%, respectively (see Callegaro &Disogra, 2008).
Weights were constructed to match demographics from the most recent Current
Population Survey data available at the time of survey administration, and all analyses
were conducted with weights.
Information and certainty measures
Quiz questions
Respondents reported whether 18 provisions were included in the ACA. A “Don’t
Know” option was not offered (cf. Mondak, 2001; Mondak & Davis, 2001).2 Twelve
of the items were about requirements or provisions in the ACA; the rest were about
provisions that were not in the legislation (see Table 1). Items in the law were chosen
from a comprehensive summary of the law’s principal provisions. The other six items
addressed false claims that had been made frequently in news coverage of the ACA.
Instructions for responding to these questions are provided in the Appendix S1, Sup-
porting Information; measures and distributions of responses to each item are shown
in Table 1 and Figure 1.3 Across both surveys, no more than 3.8% of respondents
skipped any question, and 87.8% of respondents answered all 18 questions. Individu-
als who failed to answer a question were treated as having answered neither correctly
nor incorrectly on that question.
Knowledge of the provisions varied widely—for some provisions, the vast major-
ity of respondents offered the correct answer (e.g., that individuals under age 26 can
stay on their parents’ insurance and that large companies were required to provide
insurance for their employees). For other provisions, individuals performed no better
than chance (e.g., fees for drug makers and subsidies for low income individuals; see
Table 1).The provisions varied widely in the amount of information that was dissem-
inated about them; incorrect claims were made frequently in public discourse about
some plan attributes (e.g., death panels), and little was said about other plan attributes
(e.g., a soda tax or fees for insurance companies).
Certainty
After each knowledge question, respondents were asked, “How sure are you about
this?”—“Extremely sure,” “Very sure,” “Moderately sure,” “Slightly sure,” or “Not
sure at all.” Answers were coded as follows: “Not sure at all”= 0, “Slightly sure”= .25,
“Moderately sure”= .5, “Very sure”= .75, and “Extremely sure”= 1.
Misperceptions
Respondents were regarded as holding misperceptions if they were very sure or
extremely sure about an incorrect answer (coded 1, and coded 0 otherwise).
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Distribution of Responses to Quiz and Certainty Questions Across Measures
Proportion of Responses
V
ar
ia
bl
e
100 75 50 25 0 25 50 75 100
Fee for drug makers
Treats illegals (F)
Fee for ins  companies
Subsidize care
Death panels (F)
ID card (F)
No capped coverage
Fine for uninsured
Senior drug rebate
Fine smokers (F)
No preexisting conditions
Small business credits
Make insurance for sale
Soda tax (F)
Tell employers (F)
No dropped coverage
Parents' insurance
Require large co  ins
Across all measures
(Incorrect With High Certainty)  Incorrect Correct  (Correct With High Certainty)
39.8%  (10.1%)
44.0%  (11.4%)
46.2%  (11.1%)
54.7%  (18.2%)
56.7%  (17.0%)
57.5%  (13.9%)
59.9%  (21.6%)
64.1%  (29.6%)
65.5%  (20.8%)
66.2%  (14.0%)
69.5%  (28.8%)
71.5%  (19.1%)
71.6%  (27.7%)
72.7%  (21.4%)
77.3%  (26.2%)
78.1%  (27.9%)
79.2%  (47.6%)
80.5%  (34.7%)
64.2%  (22.3%)
(6.9%)  56.3%
(17.7%)  53.2%
(6.9%)  50.7%
(9.4%)  42.5%
(11.1%)  40.0%
(13.7%)  39.8%
(7.4%)  37.0%
(7.6%)  33.5%
(7.5%)  31.6%
(8.7%)  30.7%
(5.9%)  28.2%
(5.3%)  25.7%
(8.0%)  26.0%
(6.7%)  23.9%
(5.5%)  20.1%
(4.3%)  19.2%
(4.2%)  18.3%
(3.0%)  17.1%
(7.8%)  33.0%
Not sure at all
Slightly sure
Moderately sure
Very sure
Extremely sure
Figure 1 Distributions of all certainty–correctness combinations across both years. Missing
data are included in calculating the percentages, but the percentages of missing data are not
shown. (F) Denotes items for which the correct answer was that the provision was not in the
law.
Results
Frequencies of correct and incorrect answers
All provisions
Across the two surveys, respondents answered 64.2% of the items correctly, 33.0%
incorrectly, and skipped 2.8% of the items (see Figure 1). Across the 18 items, on
average, respondents answered 11.6 items correctly and answered 5.9 incorrectly.
Vanishingly few respondents answered all the questions correctly (.05%), and no
respondents answered all questions incorrectly. Only 1.2% of respondents declined
to answer all questions.
Between 2010 and 2012, the proportion of questions that respondents declined to
answer increased from 1.2% to 4.4% (Δ= 3.2, t= 6.3, p< .001); this led respondents
to appear both less knowledgeable and less misinformed over time (see Table 2).
In 2010, respondents answered 65.0% of the questions correctly. In 2012, only
63.4% did, a small but significant decline of 1.6 percentage points (t=−2.3, p= .02).
The frequency of incorrect answers declined from 33.8% in 2010 to 32.2% in 2012
(Δ=−1.6, t=−2.7, p= .007). Among the substantive answers offered, the proportion
correct did not differ across years (65.7% vs. 66.2% of answers were correct in 2010
and 2012, respectively, t= .93, p= .35).
Individual provisions
According to the traditional measures, awareness of the elements of the law varied
considerably across provisions. Nearly 80% of respondents accurately reported that
large companies would be required to provide insurance for their employees, that
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young adults could remain on their parents’ plans, and that insurance companies
could no longer drop coverage (Figure 1). However, a majority of respondents incor-
rectly reported that the law would not introduce a fee for drug makers (56.3%), that it
would require the treatment of illegal immigrants (53.2%), and that insurance compa-
nies would not be charged a fee (50.7%). Thus, according to the traditional measure,
inaccurate beliefs about someof the less-discussed elements of the planwere common.
Using the proportion correct and incorrect measures, Americans’ awareness of
many aspects of the law fluctuated between 2010 and 2012. The percentage of Amer-
icans correctly reporting that the law would impose a fine on uninsured individuals
rose by 11.0 percentage points between 2010 and 2012 (t= 5.8, p< .001; Table 2).
Americans also became more likely to correctly report that the law prevented dis-
crimination based on preexisting conditions (Δ= 5.7, t= 3.2, p= .002) and that it
would provide seniors with a drug rebate (Δ= 5.9, t= 3.2, p= .002). In contrast, in
2012, Americans were far less aware of small business tax credits (Δ=−9.7, t=−5.5,
p< .001), subsidies for low income Americans (Δ=−6.8, t=−3.5, p< .001), and fees
for drug manufacturers (Δ=−5.9, t=−3.1, p= .002). Compared to 2010, respon-
dents in 2012 were also less likely to offer incorrect answers on questions about five
of the provisions: fines for the uninsured, preexisting conditions, the ability to stay
on parental insurance until age 26, and the end of coverage caps (Δs<−3.9, ts> 2.0,
ps< .04). The only significant increase in incorrect answers was on small businesses
tax credits (Δ= 5.4, t= 3.1, p= .002).
Frequency of high-confidence answers
In general, respondents were only moderately certain about their answers. Respon-
dents reported that they were “not at all sure” about 19.1% of their answers, “slightly
sure” about 16.4%, “moderately sure” about 32.5%, “very sure” about 17.9%, and “ex-
tremely sure” about 12.2% of their answers. Respondents chose not to answer the
certainty question for 1.8% of the provisions.
When respondents answered the quiz questions correctly, they were more certain
than when they answered incorrectly. Respondents were “very sure” or “extremely
sure” for 34.8% of correct answers and for 22.9% of incorrect answers (p< .001).
In all, respondents answered 22.3% of all questions correctly with high certainty
and answered 7.8% of the questions incorrectly with high certainty (see Figure 1).
Although confidently held accurate beliefs were more common than confidently held
inaccurate beliefs, misperceptions were common.
Certainty-adjusted measures
All provisions
In contrast to the traditional measures, certainty-adjusted measures suggest that
Americans became better informed about the provisions in the ACA. Highly certain
correct answers became more common between 2010 and 2012, rising from 21.2
to 23.3% (Δ= 2.2, t= 2.5, p= .01), while the percentage of highly certain incorrect
answers remained largely unchanged at 8.1 and 7.4% respectively (Δ=−.7, t=−1.4,
p= .16; Table 3).
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Individual provisions
The proportions of high-confidence correct responses and high-confidence incorrect
responses varied considerably across provisions. Respondents were most knowledge-
able about the provision that young adults could remain on their parents’ insurance
(47.6% answered correctly with high certainty, see Figure 1). Respondents were least
knowledgeable about fees for drugmanufacturers; only 10.1% answered this question
correctly with high certainty.The percentagemisperceiving a provision ranged from a
low of 3.1%, about whether large companies would be required to provide insurance
for their employees, to 17.9%, about whether the law mandated treatment of illegal
immigrants.
Furthermore, compared to a by-definition perfect negative correlation between
the prevalence of correct and incorrect answers ignoring certainty (r=−1.00), the
correlation between the prevalence of highly certain correct answers and highly
certain incorrect responses was much weaker (r=−.61). Thus, the provisions about
which people knew the most were not necessarily the provisions about which
misperceptions were the least common.
Between 2010 and 2012, using certainty-weighted answers, respondents’ under-
standing about some of the provisions of the law improved. Compared to 2010,
respondents in 2012 were much more likely to know about fines on the uninsured
(Δ= 13.9, t= 7.9, p< .001, Table 3), allowing young adults to stay on their parents’
plans (Δ= 9.5, t= 4.9, p< .001), requiring large employers to offer insurance (Δ= 8.4,
t= 4.5, p< .001), and outlawing denial based on preexisting conditions (Δ= 7.8,
t= 4.4, p< .001). Respondents in 2012 were also significantly more likely to know
that coverage could no longer be capped (Δ= 3.9, t= 2.4, p= .02) and that a soda tax
was not part of the plan (Δ= 3.6, t= 2.3, p= .02). Small business tax credits was the
only provision about which knowledge significantly declined over time (Δ=−3.4,
t=−2.2, p= .03). These results imply that Americans were learning about the ACA,
even though the total number of correct answers did not increase appreciably during
this period.
Whereas knowledge gains were principally associated with declines in the preva-
lence of low-certainly beliefs, knowledge gains were also sometimes accompanied by a
reduction in the frequency of misperceptions. Respondents were less likely to provide
confident incorrect answers about requirements for large companies to provide insur-
ance (Δ=−2.0, t=−2.9, p= .003, Table 3), coverage of young adults on their parents’
plans (Δ=−2.0, t=−2.5, p= .01), limits on dropped coverage (Δ=−2.5, t=−3.1,
p= .002), and fines for uninsured individuals (Δ=−2.3, t=−2.2, p= .03). The only
item on which misperceptions increased significantly between 2010 to 2012 was on
the requirement to disclosemedical conditions to employers (Δ= 1.8, t= 2.0, p= .02).
Discussion
Traditional measures of knowledge accuracy suggest that many Americans were mis-
informed about the law’s contents. Indeed, a large percentage of people incorrectly
answered at least some questions about the provisions in the law. However, many
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Americans were unsure about the incorrect answers they gave, suggesting that they
were often more uninformed than misinformed about the law.
Much past research on misinformation has assumed that anyone who answered
quiz questions incorrectly was misinformed. Instead, however, many of our survey
respondents were unsure about the incorrect answers they gave, perhaps because they
hadmerely guessed incorrectly. By allowing individuals to tell us when they were con-
fident about the veracity of their answers, we could distinguish between ignorance and
misperception.
Distinguishing between misperceptions and unconfidently held incorrect beliefs
yielded a different story about the prevalence of misinformation about the ACA, as
well as how this phenomenon changed over time. Although a majority of respon-
dents answered questions about fees for drug makers and insurance companies
incorrectly, few respondents were confident about their incorrect answers, suggesting
that ignorance was prevalent. It is perhaps unsurprising that these provisions were
relatively unknown; they were not a major component of the administration’s advo-
cacy efforts (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2013), criticism of the
law (ObamaCare Facts, n.d.), or widespread rumoring (Holan, 2013).4 In contrast,
“death panels,” a healthcare ID card, and required treatments for illegal immigrants
were answered inaccurately with confidence quite often, in line with their status as
topics of widespread rumoring (Holan, 2013; TruthorFiction.com, 2015). Notably,
the prevalence of misperceptions about these provisions remained largely static from
2010 to 2012.
In contrast to the proportion correct measure, which indicated that peo-
ple learned about some provisions and became less informed about others, the
confidence-adjusted measures documented increases in knowledge of some of the
most widely discussed provisions of the ACA. Awareness of employer mandates,
parental insurance coverage, fines for the uninsured, and the end of preexisting
conditions increased from 2010 to 2012 (cf. ObamaCare Facts, n.d.). These were
many of the same provisions for which the prevalence of misperceptions decreased
over time. Hence, the confidence-adjusted measures suggest that discussion of the
plan between 2010 and 2012 increased awareness of the law’s key provisions.
Limitations and future studies
There are limitations inherent in using certainty measures to distinguish mispercep-
tions from ignorance. First, picking a particular threshold for the level of certainty
that distinguishes ignorance from misperception is subjective. Some researchers
have suggested that answers to factual questions reflect ‘expressive responding’
(Bullock, Gerber, Hill, & Huber, 2013; Prior, Sood, & Khanna, 2013).5 For instance,
Republicans who disliked Democrats may have said that they were certain that
a disliked provision was in the ACA, despite not knowing whether the provision
was in the bill, simply because they disliked it. People might also have reported
higher certainty for answers that confirmed their preexisting attitudes. As expressive
responding would present challenges for all knowledge measurement, future studies
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should assess whether certainty-adjusted measures are more or less sensitive to these
processes. And finally, individuals who hold identical beliefs with identical levels of
certainty may nonetheless answer certainty questions differently either because of
overconfidence (Ortoleva & Snowberg, 2013) or because they interpret the mean-
ings of the rating scale points differently. Therefore, differences in knowledge and
misinformation we observed may be due to shifts in the accuracy of beliefs among
individuals who expressed consistently high (or low) certainty. All of these concerns
suggest that confidently held answers are not a perfect metric for the substantive
beliefs that people hold and use, though using certainty is likely a better indicator
than a simple tally of correct or incorrect responses.
Conclusion
This study indicates that the practice of distinguishing between individuals who are
certain about incorrect beliefs (i.e., hold misperceptions) and those who are incorrect
and unsure can alter the substantive conclusions that researchers reach. Incorrect
answers to questions about the Affordable Care Act were far more common than con-
fidently held incorrect responses. Furthermore, confidently heldmisperceptions were
most common for provisions about which inaccurate rumors spread most promi-
nently. Moreover, where accurate information was widely disseminated, respondents
increasingly held correct beliefs with confidence.These increases were associatedwith
a corresponding reduction in both less confidently held beliefs and some reduction
in confidently held incorrect beliefs. Similar changes were not observed, however, for
less widely discussed provisions of the law. Thus, despite widespread inaccuracy in
responses to quiz questions about the ACA, our results provide hopeful evidence that
most Americans were not mired in a web of misinformation and that dissemination
of correct information about the law can alter beliefs.
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Notes
1 One can try to adjust for guessing-related error by assuming that guessing is random. For
example, if a quiz question offers two possible answers, then one might assume that
respondents who guess the answer have a 50% chance of answering incorrectly. But such
adjustments can only be made in the aggregate and do not deliver individual level
measures that we would ideally like to have. Moreover, much past research shows that
guessing is often biased (Attali & Bar-Hillel, 2003). Even when asked to select randomly
between offered options, respondents’ selections show asymmetic patterns (Ayton, Hunt,
& Wright, 1989).
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2 See Luskin and Bullock (2011) for a contrary position.
3 A 19th question was asked in 2010, but was not included in the analyses reported here,
because the question wording made it ambiguous as to whether the provision was in the
bill.
4 Because many of the provisions of the law were not associated with consistent terminology
and the words used were common to news coverage of the law (e.g., “drug” and “fee”
appeared many times in news articles although it was not a widely discussed provision),
there was no way to identify the prevalence of discussion about these provisions in a search
of news articles. Instead, we considered whether information about the law or formal
responses to rumors about the law mentioned these provisions as a way of indexing their
commonality. For comparison purposes, a Lexis-Nexis search of the prevalence of related
terms is shown in Table A1 in Online Appendix S1.
5 Berinsky (2015) found that expressive responding was relatively rare.
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Additional supporting information may be found in the online version of this article:
Appendix S1. Instructions for answering the information items.
Journal of Communication 65 (2015) 660–673 © 2015 International Communication Association 673
